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EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS,
VOTING RIGHTS, AND PLANT CLOSINGS*

Congress has enacted many statutes which provide tax incentives for
the transfer of a corporate employer's stock to its employees. 1, One of
these, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 2
provides for the creation of special employee benefit arrangements called
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). 3 Several hundred corporations have already set up ESOPs for their employees. 4
After examining the structure and tax consequences of ESOPs, this
note will argue that ESOPs should guarantee employees full voting rights 5
over securities transferred to them under such plans. This note will also
propose that ESOPs can be used in employee takeovers of corporations
as part of a plan to help prevent plant closings.

*The author is deeply indebted to Mr. Michael A. Conte, a graduate student in economics
at the University of Michigan, for his help in preparing this manuscript.
I Five acts have included special provisions for employee stock ownership plans of
various types. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp. 1975)) (19 U.S.C. § 2373 (f)(I) (Supp. 1975) authorized the
Secretary of Commerce to give a -preference to corporations which establish qualified
employee stock ownership plans.); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat.
1520 (codified in scattered sections in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 29 U.S.C.
(Supp. 1977)) (Section 802 of the Act extends the investment tax.credit for certain corporations' employee stock ownership plans which is authorized in I.R.C. § 46(a)(I).); Tax
Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 (Supp. 1976).) (i.R'.C. §§ 46(a)(I) codifies the investment tax credit for corporations
which adopt certain employee stock ownership plans.); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 29 U .S.C. (Supp. 1976)) (Employee stock ownership
plans are defined in I.R.C. § 4975(e)(8).); and Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985, (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (Supp. 1976)). (Employee
stock ownership plans are defined at 45 U .S.C. § 702 (Supp. 1976).).
2
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and 29 U .S.C. (Supp.
1976)) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
3
For discussions of the impact of ER ISA on the concept of employee stock ownership
plans, see Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism,
55 B.U.L. REv. 195 (1975); Note, Recent Developments in Employee Stock Ownership
Plans. 16 WASHBURN L.J. 709 (1977).
4
The Internal Revenue Service has acknowledged at least 250 such plans. T1ME, Oct. 4,
1976, at 80. A Congressional report estimates that between 200 to 500 such plans have been
established. STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., BROADENING THE
OWNERSHIP OF NEW CAPITAL: ESOPS AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES 58 (Comm. Print 1976).
5 See notes 27 _& 28 and accompanying text infra.
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ESOPs

An ESOP is a stock bonus plan that qualifies as a tax-exempt, empl<?yee
benefit trust plan by meeting the requirements of ERISA and the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC). 6 Although ESOPs are very similar to
pension plans, they differ in two important respects. While pensions tend
to invest in a variety of securities, the Employee Stock Ownership Trust
(ESOT) created by the ESOP must invest "primarily" in "qualifying
employer securities. " 7 Furthermore, the benefits from the ESOT must be
distributed to the employees in the form of securities of the employer
corporation rather than in cash, as with other pension plans. 8 Since
ESOPs are deferred compensation plans, an employee's interests in
ESOT holdings are typically distributed when he terminates his employment with the corporation. 9
ESOPs must also comply with the general requirements of the IRC
which are applicable to all employee benefit plans. 1 ° Consequently,
ESOPS must be set up for the "exclusive benefit" of employees or their
beneficiaries.11 In addition, ERISA requires that each plan be managed
by a fiduciary who must act solely in the interests of the employees or
their beneficiaries .12
The tax consequences of ESOPs are similar to those of other deferred
compensation employee benefit plans . 13 Typically, the employer corporation is entitled to deduct from its gross income the fair market value of its

6

The basic requirements are outlined in the definition ofan ESOP as a contribution plan:
(A) which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock bonus and money
purchase plan both of which are qualified under section 40J(a), and which are
designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities; and
(B) which is otherwise defined in regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate.
ERISA § 2003(a), l.R.C. § 4975(e)(7). l.R.C. § 401(a) outlines the requirements for employee
benefit plans to qualify for tax preferences. The Secretary of the Treasury is primarily
responsible for regulations concerning ESOPs, although the Secretary of Labor is also
entitled to issue regulations concerning some aspects of ESOPs. ERIS A § 407, 29 U .S.C.
§ 1107 (1975).
' "Qualifying employer securities" include stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, and other
certificates of indebtedness issued by the employer: ERISA § 407(d)(5), l.R.C. § 4975(e)(8).
Most practitioners interpret "primarily" to mean that at least 75 % of the ESOT holdings
should be "qualifying employer securities." Bushman, ESOPs: A Trustee's Perspective, 115
TR. & EST. 416, 417 (1976).
8
Fractional shares may, however, be distributed in cash. Treas. Reg.§ l.401-l(a)(2)(iii),
(b)(l)(iii), Rev. Rul. 71-256, 1971-1 C.B. 118.
9
The employee may elect special lump sum distribution tax treatment under l.R.C.
§ 402(e), or he may receive his distribution as an annuity under I.R.C. §§ 72, 402(a).
10
In order to be exempted from federal taxation by I.R.C. § 501, a trust which forms a
part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan for employees must comply with
certain requirements relating to employer contributions, vesting, nondiversion, coverage,
nondiscrimination, and forfeitures. l.R.C. § 401.
11 l.R.C. § 401(a)(2).
12
ERISA § 404(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(J) (1975).
13
For a fuller discussion of the tax implications of ESOPs, see Pavlock & Lieberman, The
Taxation of ESOTs (pts. I & 2), 7 TAX ADVISER 68, 132 (1976). See also Pavlock &
Lieberman, Employee Stock Ownership Trusts-An Update, 8 TAX ADVISER 476 (1977);
Note, Recent D.evelopments in Employee Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 3.
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contributions to the ESOT up to 15 percent of the compensation of
covered employees.14 Excess contributions may be carried forward or
back for additional tax deductions. 15 Income of the ESOT is tax-exempt
so long as it continues to comply with the relevant IRC provisions. 16
Moreover, employee interests in ESOTs are not taxed until they are
actually distributed .1 7

II. ESOPs AND VoTING RIGHTS
A. Present Law

Because ESOPs invest primarily in employer securities, the question of
who should control the voting of such securities is of particular importance. Presently, the employer securities held by the ESOT need not have
any voting rights attached to them. 18 If the securities do have voting
rights, they are exercised by the plan fiduciary, 19 who is typically appointed by the board of directors of the employer corporation. 20 Employees are not guaranteed the right to direct the fiduciary's voting of
such securities. 21 Thus, the only effective way that employees can gain
control over their interests in the ESOT is through collective bargaining
negotiations.
In an apparent effort to further protect employee interests, the Internal
Revenue Service proposed regulations which would have entitled each
employee to direct the fiduciary's voting of any shares of employer
securities with voting rights which had been allocated to his individual
account. 22 If an ESOT borrowed money to acquire employer securities,
14
I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A); Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 237 (1969). Contributions may be in
the form of cash, stock, or other property. ERISA §§ 406(a)(l)(E), (2), 407(a)(I), 414(a). 29
U.S.C. §§ I 106(a)(l)(E), (2), I 107(a)(I) I I 14(a) (1975). For a discussion of the difficulties in
valuing contributions of employer securities to ESOTs, see Clausen, ESOP Stock Valuation: A Case for Liquidity, 115 TR. & EsT. 419 (1976).
1s I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A).
16
A trust described in I.R.C. § 401(a) is exempted from federal taxation by I.R.C. §
501(a). See notes 10 & 11 supra concerning the various requirements of a trust under I.R.C.
§ 401(a).
17 I.R.C. § 402(a)(I). See note 9, supra.
18
See note 7, supra. ERISA § 407 (d)(5), I.R.C. § 4975(e)(8) is the sole provision
stipulating the type of securities an ESOT must hold.
19 1.R.C. § 4975(e)(3).
20
Most plans provide for a fiduciary appointed by the board of directors to vote the
securities or for an administrative committee, also appointed by the board, to direct the
fiduciary's voting. Bushman, supra note 7, at 434; Knight, The Increasing Importance of
ESOPs in Employee Benefit Planning. Estate Planning, and Corporate Finance, 12 GEORGIA ST. B.J. 6, 43-44 (1975). Indeed, members of the board of directors may serve as
fiduciaries or as members of the administrative committee. Questions and Answers Relating
to Fiduciary Responsibility Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1975).
21
ERISA is silent as to employee direction of the fiduciary's voting, though employees
may sometimes sit on the administrative committee which directs the fiduciary. Bushman,
supra note 7, at 434.
22
41 Fed. Reg. 31, 833 ( 1976). The Secretary of the Treasury derives his authority to issue
such regulations from ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7). See note 6, supra.
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the proposed regulations would have limited the percentage of nonvoting
securities which could be purchased. 23 If the ESOT did not borrow
money to acquire employer securities, however, the proposed regulations
would not have required the ESOT to· hold any voting employer securities. 24 Thus, although the proposed regulations would have provided
employee control over the exercise of voting rights on employer securities, they would not have guaranteed that all employer shares held by
ESOT be vested with voting rights.
Nevertheless, even the limited expansion of employee control proposed by the Internal Revenue Service met with strong opposition from
Congress. The Conference Report which accompanied the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 specifically criticized the proposed regulations, and expressed
the belief that "the usual rules applicable to employee plans properly
protect the interests of plan participants. " 25 Subsequently, the Internal
Revenue Service issued final regulations which withdrew the proposed
regulations to expand employee voting rights. 26 Therefore, employees are
still not assured of any voting control over employer securities held by
ESOTs.
B. The Need for Full Voting Rights

The fundamental policy of BRISA is to protect the interests of employees in their benefit plans. 27 In keeping with this policy, employees
should be guaranteed full voting control over all employer securities held
by an ESOT. Specifically, each employee should be entitled to direct the
fiduciary's voting of all employer securities held by the ESOT on his
behalf, whether allocated to his individual account or not. 28
The proposed regulations provide "that each participant is entitled to direct a designated
fiduciary as to the manner in which any employer security allocated to the account of such
participant is to be voted."
Proposed Treas. Reg.§ 54.4975-ll(d)(2)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,837 (1976). They also would
have required that voting rights "be exercised only to the extent directed by participants"
and that "[a]mounts contributed to an ESOP by an employer ... be allocated to the account
of each participant" by the close of the plan year. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975l l(d)(2)(iii), (c)(l)(i), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,837, 31,836 (1976).
23
Specifically, no more than 25 % of such securities could be nonvoting. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(2)(i)(8)(5), 41 Fed. Reg. 31,835 (1976).
24
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11, 41 Fed. Reg. 31,836 (1976) is silent on this matter.
25
H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 539, 541 (1976), reprinted in [1976) U.S.
CODE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 4234, 4236.
26
42 Fed. Reg. 44,388, 44,389 (1977).
27
See generally the findings and declarations of policy for ERISA. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1975). A number of other writers have recognized the need for an approach which
would guarantee employees more voting control over ESOT holdings. See generally Berman, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and Implementation of Worker Management, 1976 ASSOCIATION FOR SELF-MANAGEMENT NEWSLETTER No. 19, 2; Carlson, ESOP
and Universal Capitalism, 31 TAX L. REV. 289 (1976); Ditkoff, The IRS Proposes New
Regulations to Reform the Prodigal ESOP, 54 TAXES 630 (1976); Note, Employee Stock
Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, supra note 3.
28
Employees should be entitled to direct the voting of unallocated securities· in proportion
to their interests in the ESOT. Of course, this requirement should apply only to securities
which could be voted by the fiduciary. For example, if an ESOT borrows money in order to
purchase employer securities, it may have to pledge those securities and their voting rights
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1. ESOPs as employee benefit plans-Although ESOPs are basically
employee benefit plans, they are not gifts to the employees. 29 Rather,
employer contributions to an ESOP are additional labor costs which an
employer must pay for employee services. 30 As a result, whenever employees receive an ESOP benefit, they forego other employee benefits.
Thus, ESOPs are essentially investments, primarily in employer securities, of employee compensation. 31
ESOP investments may be more attractive to employees than comparable wage increases because of the deferred taxation of ESO P interests. 32
However, they may be considerably less attractive, economically, than
comparably funded diversified investment plans such as ordinary pensions. 33 ESOPs are less attractive because they involve greater risks; that
is, for any given rate of expected return, the expected variation in that
rate of return is greater for an ESOP than for a diversified investment
portfolio. 34 The risks of diversified plans may be further reduced with
investment securities which are safer than those of the employer. 35 Thus,
an ESOP faces a higher risk of great depreciation in value than does a
diversified plan. 36 This higher risk is a direct consequence of the requireas collateral for the loan. The ESOT then would not have control over the voting of such
shares and thus the requirement of passing through voting rights should not apply to such
securities.
29
Several commentators implicitly view contributions to an ESOT as gifts to employees.
Consequently, they erroneously conclude that the value of corporate stock is diluted more
by such contributions than by comparable employee benefits. See, e.g., Blum, ESOPs as
Financing Vehicles: Dilution Aspects, 7 TAX ADVISER 452 (1976); Huene, Beware the
ESOP: A Cautionary Tale. 7 TAX ADVISOR 722 (1976). As long as a corporation seek profits,
however, its contributions to an ESOT will be no more gifts to employees than are wages or
ordinary pension benefits. For such a corporation, its contribution to an ESOT will not
dilute the value of corporate stock any more than will alternate employee benefits.
3
° Contributions of cash to an ESOT entail costs to the corporation in that present equity
is reduced. Even where an employer contributes treasury stock to an ESOT, there will be a
real cost to the corporation and its shareholders since future profits must be shared and
present per share equity is reduced.
31
See notes 6 & 7, supra, for a discussion of ESOT investments in employer securities.
32 See note 17 and accompanying text supra. ESOP investments may also be more
attractive to management and shareholders than other less flexible forms of employee
compensation. For example, an ESOP may be used to create a market for stock of a
closely-held corporation. ESOPs also may be used to obtain equity capital, to acquire
control of independent corporations, and to increase current tax deductions. See generally
Knight, ESOPs Offer Employee Benefits, Corporate Financing and Control, Estate Planning, 43 J. TAX. 258 (1975); Note, Employee Stock Ownership Trusts: Tax Advantages for
Estate Planning in Close Corporations, 84 YALE L. J. 1519 (1975); and Carlson, supra note
27, at 294-300.
33
Pension funds are required to diversify their investments. ERISA § 404(a)(l){C), 29
U.S.C. § ll04(a)(l){C) (1975). ESOPs are specifically exempted from this diversificatior.
requirement. ERISA § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(2) (1975).
34
When time is held constant, the riskiness of an investment will decrease as the number
of holdings increases. While the marginal decrease in risk resulting from each additional
holding becomes negligible as the number of holdings increases above five holdings, diversification can reduce risk substantially up to that point. R. BREALY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 123-32 (1969).
35 ESOPs, on the other hand, must always invest primarily in employer securities. See
notes 6 & 7 supra.
36 Indeed, the value of securities in 60% to 70% of corporations actually declines over the
life of an employee. Drucker, Pension Fund "Socialism," 42 Pue. INT. 3, IO (1976). While
diversified investments may also depreciate in value, diversification will reduce the average
size of such depreciation. See R. BREAL Y, supra note 34, at 123-32.
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ment that ESOPs invest primarily in employer securities. 37 Since many
employees will have much of their savings invested through their corporation's employee benefit plan; ESOPs will usually be Jess attractive to
them than a comparably funded diversified plan. 38
It has been argued, however, that ESOPs are more valuable to employees than diversified plans. 39 According to this view, ESOT holdings
will appreciate faster than diversified plan holdings because employees'
beneficial interests in the corporation, wholly apart from any voting
rights, will prompt them to work harder, increase their productivity, and
thereby earn greater profits for the corporation. 40 Little evidence c_an be
found to support this view, however. 41 Indeed, indirect rewards are
generally ineffective in' increasing employee productivity. 42 Moreover,
unless the ESOT holds a large percentage of the corporation's securities,
there is no reason to expect employees to be more productive since most
of the increased earnings would go to nonemployee shareholders. 43

37
Drucker, supra note 36, at 10, therefore concludes that ESOPs are "financially unsound to the point of recklessness."
·
38
Admittedly, diversification also reduces the chance of an investment plan making great
gains. It has been argued that employees should gamble their savings in an undiversified
portfolio on the chance of such gains. For example, attorney Louis Kelso, the originator of
the ESOP idea, sees diversification as "something a rich man does in order not to become
poor. A poor man who has nothing loses nothing if it fails but can stand to reap huge rewards
if it succeeds." Quoted in O'Hara & Crawford, Will Every Corporation Have an E.S.O.P.?
Senator Long Makes it Hard to Say No, 61 A.B.A.J. 1366, (1975). Actually, employees face
a greater chance of losing their retirement savings if they have an ESOP instead of a
diversified plan.
39
Id. at 1369; Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOPs): Hearings before the Joint
Economic Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), at 689 [hereinafter cited as Employee Sock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs)] (Submission of the United States Railway Ass'n).
40
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), supra note 39, at 689 (Submission of the
United States Railway Ass'n).
41
Id. at 690-91, 787-97 (Submissions of the United States Railway Ass'n). For example, a
study of 15 corporations with established ESOPs did not find any convincing evidence that
employees became more motivated or more productive. Id. at 793. For a rebuttal see id. at
·
263-355 (Submission of attorney Louis Kelso).
42
See generally E. LAWLER III, MOTIVATION IN WORK ORGANIZATIONS (1973). Lawler
suggests that economic rewards are effective in increasing employee productivity only when
they are closely tied to individual employee performance. That is, the more indirect the
reward, the less likely it is that an employee's individual performance will be affected. For
example, a machine operator is likely to be far more motivated by a bonus based on the
output from his machine than he would be by a stock option plan. The value of a stock
option depends upon the productivity of all employees and on the ability of the company to
succeed in the marketplace while the employee's bonus is dependent solely upon his
individual productivity. Thus, company-wide incentive plans are unlikely to have great
effects on employee productivity.
43
There is evidence that a financial consideration approximating 20% of pay is necessary
to secure some increase in employee .productivity. Therefore, a substantial percentage of
stock would have to be transferred to employees before dividend payments would produce
additional compensation sufficient to lead to motivational changes. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). supra note 39, at 816 (Submission of John J. Terry, Vice President
Financial Planning, United States Railway Ass'n). There is also some evidence that an
important correlate of profits is the percent of a company's equity which is owned by its
non-managerial employees. Based on a limited sample of companies, it has been found that
the greater this percent, the greater the profits of the firm. M. CoNTE & A.TANNENBAUM,
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REPORT TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION UNffED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PROJECT No. 99-6-09433 at 2-3 (1977). Other
investigators have also found superior employee productivity in corporations fully owned by
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Furthermore, even if it is true that ESOPs stimulate higher productivity, employees still face a higher risk of depreciation of their interests than
they would face with a diversified plan. The higher risk remains because
corporations with ESOPs may still decline or go out of business because
of technological change or mismanagement. Thus, even if ESOPs increase employee productivity, it is questionable whether the resulting
increased expected return compensates for the high risk inherent in such
undiversified ESOP investments. 44
ESOPs with sufficiently higher expected returns could be more attractive than undiversified plans. One way to boost expected return is to
require that full voting rights be passed through to employees, since
studies have shown that employee productivity does increase when employees are allowed a greater voice in the management of their corporations. 45 Such a requirement could make it more likely that expected
returns would be high enough to offset the greater risks of having an
undiversified ESOP investment.
ESOPs which give employees full voting rights may also be attractive to
employees because of the intrinsic, non-economic value of voting rights.
Since surveys of employee attitudes have shown that many employees
desire to have a greater voice in the management of their corporations, 46
voting rights in employer securities may have an inherent psychological
value to employees. When this value is also taken into consideration,
ESOPs which grant full voting rights may be even more attractive to
employees than comparably funded diversified investment.

employees. See K. BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 189-90 (1967); Bernstein, Run Your Own Business, I WORKING PAPERS FOR A
~~w SoCIETY 24, 26-28 (1974); TIME, Oct. 4, 1976, at 80. Of course, the increased productivity ma~ often be explained by other factors, such as the difference in management
approach m employee owned corporations. See E. LAWLER Ill, supra note 42, at 120-21.
44
The primary effect of higher productivity would be to increase the expected value or a
corporation's securities. If the ESOT investment remains undiversified, the higher risk of
greater depreciation will remain. A substantially higher expected return would be necessary
to compensate for the intrinsic value of a more secure investment. Therefore, a greater
percentage of the employer securities would have to be transferred to the ESOT to make the
gamble worthwhile, especially if most of each employee's retirement savings are involved.
See note 43 supra.
45
See generally E. LAWLER Ill, supra note 42, at 182-83; P. WARR & T. WALL, WORK
AND WELL-BEING 86-115 (1975); Brower, Experience with Seif-management and Participation in United States Industry, in ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATION AND
SELF-MANAGEMENT 73 (G. Garson & M. Smith eds. 1976). The percentage of employee
held voting shares required to trigger increases in productivity is not certain. It does not
seem unreasonable, however, to suggest that this threshold level might be met by the
presence of at least one employee representative on the board of directors.
46
P. WARR & T. WALL, supra note 45, -at 86-115, documents studies that employees value
increased participation in corporate decision-making. Furthermore, a recent public opinion
survey conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., of Washington, D.C., found
that most Americans favor giving employees greater control over their corporations. Fifty
percent of the people surveyed thought that employee owned and controlled corporations
would improve the economy, and 66% thought that it would "do more good than harm" to
develop programs whereby employees could gain ownership of a majority of a company's
stock. Small Business and Society: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small
Business. 94the Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975) (Statement of Sheila Rollins). See also J. RIFKIN,
OWN YouR OWN Joa: ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY FOR WORKING AMERICANS 105-77 (1977).
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Even if employees have full voting rights, the transfer by a corporation
of a small percentage of its securities to an ESOT will give employees
little additional representation in corporate affairs and only a small part of
the corporate earnings. In such cases, employees probably will not be
more productive and will be better off with other kinds of benefits. On the
other hand, if a corporation transfers a large percentage of its securities to
an ESOT, employees are likely to receive a more valuable benefit since
they will acquire some control over the corporation and the right to much
of its earnings. Thus, at a minimum, ESOPs should be required to pass
full voting rights through to employees. 47 Furthermore, the Congress
should consider limiting ESOP tax preferences to those plans which
transfer a large percentage of the corporation's securities to the ESOT. 48
2. Protection of employee interests-The guarantee of full voting rights
includes the requirements that all employer shares held by ESOTs have
voting rights and that employees be entitled to direct the fiduciary's
voting of those shares. It may be argued that employees are better off
having a competent fiduciary vote the shares without their direction.
Since the fiduciary is chosen and serves at the grace of the existing board
ofdirectors, 49 however, he may represent management's interests rather
than those of the employees. 50 Although an ESOP fiduciary can be sued
for breach of his fiduciary responsibilities, such suits may provide only
minimal protection for employee interests. 51
In addition, employees are capable of determining what is in their best
interests and voting accordingly. 52 While employees may have difficulty
making complex management decisions, they are certainly as competent
as other shareholders to decide basic questions of corporate policy and to
select the board of directors. 53 Employees have successfully participated
47

See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
Congress should allow tax benefits only to those plans which will pass sufficient
securities to the ESOT to enable employees to elect at least one member of the board of
directors. In addition, plans should not be entitled to tax benefits unless sufficient securities have vested in individual accounts within 10 years of initiating the plan to enable the
employees to control the corporation. Finally, employee approval should be required before
a plan can be adopted.
49
See note 20 supra.
50
Indeed, some plans are designed to have a "friendly" fiduciary or administrative
committee. Knight, supra note 20, at 44. Of course, employers can more easily circumvent
the interests of employees by transferring only nonvoting securities to the ESOT, id. at 44.
51
Under earlier law the employees had the burden of proving that the fiduciary acted in
bad faith, arbitrarily, or fraudulently in order to prevail in such suits. 60 AM. JuR. 20
Pensions and Retirement Funds § 78 (1976). The standards of fiduciary conduct under
ERISA have not yet been fully developed. But see Eaves v. Penn, 426 F. Supp. 830 (W.D.
Okla. 1976).
52
It may be argued that a fiduciary selected by employees or by their collective bargaining
representatives could better represent employee interests. While such a mechanism could
well give employees as a group greater power, employees are not a homogenous group and
probably would not agree on all issues. If employees wish to vote their shares together
voluntarily, they should be allowed to do so. However, requiring that employee shares be
voted by a labor-selected fiduciary is no better than having them all voted by a
management-selected fiduciary. In either case, the employee is being denied the right to
direct his own investment in employer securities. There is no compelling reason to treat
employee interests in ESOTs differently from the interests of nonemployee shareholders.
53
Indeed, because of their work experience, they may be better informed about the
corporation's operations than the typical shareholder.
48
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in the management of corporations in other countries. 54 Moreover, participation experiments in this country have shown that employees and
management can cooperate in formulating corporate policies. 55 Finally,
numerous successful corporations in this country are already full owned
and operated by their employees. 56 Thus, there is little reason to believe
that employees are not at least as capaole of directing the voting of
employer securities as a fiduciary.
Furthermore, the extension offull voting rights to employees would not
conflict with the main purposes ofESOPs.57 Some corporations might be
discouraged from establishing ESOPS if full voting rights are required.
Given the undiversified nature of E.SOT investments, however, this requirement is necessary to protect the employees' benefit. Nor should it be
forgotten that ESOPs are to be set up for the "exclusive benefit" of
employees or their beneficiaries. 58 Finally, passing through full voting
rights should reduce the amount of conflict between management and
employees and lead to a more democratic economy. 59
These considerations find support in the Internal Revenue Code and at
least one state statute, which already encourage some extension of full
voting rights to employees. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 allows corporations to take extra investment tax credits if they make contributions
of employer securities to an employee stock ownership trust and allow
employees to direct the voting of such securities. 60 Similarly, Minnesota
has granted state tax deductions to encourage employee stock ownership
plans which grant full voting rights to employees. 61 Thus, there is statutory encouragement for guaranteeing full voting rights to employees.
54 In West Germany, for example, there are employee representatives in the management
of most large corporations. There- is no indication that such participatitn has reduced the
profits and productivity of such corporations. See generally Woolridge, The System of
Codetermination in Western Germany and its Proposed Reform, 5 ANGLO AM. L. REV. 19
(1976); Comment, Codetermination in __ West Germany, 51 ORE. L. REV. 214 (1971); Ball,
,Hard Hats in Europe's Boardrooms, FORTUNE, June, 1976, at 180. For a discussion of the
implications of the European experiences for United States labor-management relations, see
Murphy, Workers on the Board: Borrowing a European Idea, 27 LAB. L.J. 751 (1976).
55 See note 45 supra.
56
See K. BERMAN, note 43 supra; Bernstein, note 43 supra; J. RIFKIN, note 46 supra, at
27-43; M. CONTE & A. TANNENBAUM, note 43 supra.
57 ESOPs have been justified on the grounds that they serve important capital formation
and estate planning functions. Knight, fiote 20 supra. Furthermore, attorney Louis Kelso
claims that the ESOPs can be used to guide economic planning, achieve economic growth
and stability, and promote "universal capitalism." Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(ESOPs), supra note 39, at 139 (prepared statement of Louis Kelso). While it is questionable
whether or not ESOPs actually serve all these functions, maximizing employee voting is not
inconsistent with any of them.
58 See note 11 and accompanying text supra. In the words of one writer, "[i]t may be far
bett~r to have no ESOP at all than an employee benefit plan which benefits only the
employer." Ditkoff, supra note 27, at 634.
59 While there might be numerous boardroom fights between management and labor
initially, the continued dialogue and the sharing of management functions should lead to
greater cooperation. Furthermore, this similarity of purpose should increase as the employees receive more employer securities. See M. CoNTE & A. TANNENBAUM, supra, note
43 at 39-65.
60 I.R.C. § 46(a)(l). For a fuller discussion of the employee stock ownership plans created
pursuant to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, see Carlson, supra note 27, at 304-12. See also
Note, Recent Developments in Employee Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 3, at 716-18.
61
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 290 et seq. (West 1974).
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Ill. ESOPs AND PLANT CLOSINGS

Plant closings and relocations are often accompanied by major social
and economic costs. Unemployment due to plant shut-downs is a critical
problem for many local communities and their residents. 62 Costs to
former employees include loss of income and adverse psychological consequences. 63 Costs borne by federal, state, and local treasuries include
income maintenance benefits to the newly unemployed and loss of income, sales, and business tax revenues. 64 Although it is clearly in the
public interest to reduce these costs, the Federal government has no
comprehensive program to deal with plant shut-downs. 65
Many plants are closed for sound economic reasons. Other plants,
which have high profit margins or good prospects for significant long-term
growth, are likely to be sold rather than closed. 66 The decision to close or
relocate, however, may lead to the liquidation of an intermediate
category-economically viable plants. 67 This tendency is indirectly permitted and indirectly encouraged by federal, state, and local government
actions. Many states and municipalities induce relocation by providing
62
For example, a total of 200,000 jobs were lost in Michigan as a result of plant closures
and relocations from 1967 through 1973. The National Employment Priorities Act: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor on
H.R. 76, 94th Cong., !st Sess. 46 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The National Employment
Priorities Act]. Furthermore, about one-half of the shut-downs occurred in the seven-county
Detroit region, where unemployment was already in excess of the State average. Id. at 22.
63
The magnitude of these costs depend largely on whether and how quickly the unemployed can be reabsorbed by the local economy. This, in turn, depends upon the degree of
local unemployment, the ability of the employer to transfer employees to other plants, and
the skill level and age of the newly unemployed. M. AIKEN, L. FERMAN,&. H. SHEPPARD,
ECONOMIC FAILURE, ALIENATION AND EXTREMISM 30 (1968). The psychological dangers
include alienation, feelings of helplessness, feelings of worthlessness, depression, and
possible suicidal tendencies. For an excellent discussion of all costs of individual plant
closings, see SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, 86TH CONG., lsT
SESS., Too OLD TO WORK-Too YOUNG TO RETIRE: A CASE STUDY OF A PERMANENT
PLANT SHUTDOWN (Comm. Print 1960).
64
For example, estimated federal and state costs of making unemployment compensation
payments and sustaining personal income tax losses for the head of a family of four with
income of at least $165 per week in the State of Michigan were at least $3200 for one year in
1977. This estimate does not include other income maintenance or any tax losses. Since
former employees of corporations which have shut down may be unemployed for many
months, the public sector costs of plant closings can be very high. See generally M. AIKEN,
L. FERMAN & H. SHEPPARD, supra note 63.
65
A number of Western European countries do have programs to deal with this type of
problem. See The National Employment Priorities Act, supra note 62, at 85-96 (Workers'
Rights and Plant Shutdowns, statement prepared by the U.A.W.); Id. at 118-126 (Plant
Closure and Relocation Laws in Western Europe, statement prepared by the staff of the
Library of Cong., Law Library).
66
While there is no way to estimate how many economically viable plants have shut
down. a number of plants which would have closed down had their employees not purchased
them are still in operation. The two plants of this group which have had time to establish a
performance record seem to be operating successfully. M. CoNTE & A. TANNENBAUM,
supra note 43, at 39-65 (South Bend Lathe Co.); J. RIFKIN, supra note 46, at 41-43 (Vermont
Asbestos Group).
67
An economically viable plant may be considered to be one which can meet all of its
short-term and long-term obligations. Under this view even plants which generate only small
profits must be considered economically viable in that they can sustain their operations over
an indefinite period of time.
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property tax incentives, loans, and lower pollution and occupational
health and safety standards. 68 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Code
permits corporations to deduct the costs of relocating as ordinary expenses of doing business, and investment tax credits and accelerated
depreciation allowances may actually encourage the closing of viable
plants and the opening of new ones. 69 In addition, federal and state labor
laws. impose no meaningful restrictions on the right of corporations to
relocate for economic reasons. 70 Thus, the combined actions of the private market and various levels of government can lead to the closing of
some economically viable plants.
ESOPs can serve as the basis for a federal program to reduce the
number of plant closings, since ESOPs can be used to enable employees
to purchase their plants and keep them operating. This employee buyout
mechanism is initiated by first having the employer corporation establish
an ESOP. The ESOT then borrows money and purchases all outstanding
employer securities in the plant corporation involved. 71 The loan is secured by the ESOT's pledge of all those securities as collateral and by the
plant corporation's promise to make sufficient annual contributions of
cash to the ESOT to enable it to repay the loan. 72 As the ESOT pays off
the loan, the lender must gradually release the pledged securities. 73 In this
way the ESOT comes to hold and control all of the outstanding plant
securities, and these are allocated to individual accounts. Thus, ESOPs
can provide a mechanism for employees to purchase their plant with
borrowed funds. Because of the tax advantages of ESOPs, the purchase
can be accomplished at lower effective cost to the employees through an
ESOP than through a direct purchase. 74
68
The National Employments Priorities Act, supra note 62, at 86 (statement prepared by
the United Automobile Workers).
69 Id. at 86; see also I.R.C. § 162 (business expenses); I.R.C. § 38 (investment tax credit);
I.R.C. § 167 (depreciation).
70
See note 68 supra.
71
If the employer corporation operates more than one plant, the plant to be divested
should be separately incorporated as a plant corporation.
ESOTs are specifically authorized to borrow money in order to purcha,e employer
securities. ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § I 108(b)(3) (1975); ERISA § 2003(a), I.R.C. § 4975
(d)(3).
72
In most cases collateral for an ESOP loan may consist only of qualifying employer
securities. ERIS A § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § I 108(b)(3) (1975).
73
In general, the loan must provide for the proportional release from encumbrance of plan
assets used as collateral for the loan. Treas. Reg.§ 54.4975-7(b)(8)(i), 42 Fed. Reg. 44,391
(1977). For example, if 15,000 shares of X stock are pledged as collateral for a 15 year loan
payable in level annual amounts, then 1 /isth or 1,000 shares must be released in each
succeeding year of the loan. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8)(iv), 42 Fed. Reg. 44392 (1977).
For loans of a JO to 15 year maximum duration, this requirement poses minimal interference with the employee's takeover of the plant corporation. A gradual release of shares from
the lender's encumbrance may even promote the gradual and orderly transfer of control of
the plant corporation from management to employee representatives. Loans of a duration of
more than 15 years seem to require an unreasonably long time period to transfer control and
should be prohibited by statute or regulation.
74
Since employer contributions to ESOTs are tax deductible (see note 14 supra), and
taxation of employee interests is deferred until distribution, when their tax brackets will
probably be lower (see note 17 supra), the employees can use the ESOP to purchase the
corporation with pre-tax.dollars. In the alternative, the employees would have to purchase
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Unfortunately, sufficient private sector financing for such purchases is
not always available to ESOTs. 75 Lenders may be skeptical of the employees' ability to run a company that earlier owners are abandoning. In
addition, employees often have no capital of their own to risk. Therefore,
the federal government should loan funds or guarantee loans to ESOTs to
enable employees to keep their plants open. 76 Of course, these funds or
guarantees should only be provided to ESOTs which cannot secure private sector financing. 77 Furthermore, government funding or guarantees
should only be available to ESOTs in plants that can be expected to
survive the rigors of competition and sustain a profit. 78
By preserving jobs such a program could significantly reduce the burdens placed on local economies by the closing of economically viable
plants. If the guidelines for eligibility for government aid are carefully
developed, the program could certainly be financially sound. Furthermore, such a program could lead to continued growth in this country's
productive capacity and perhaps even reduce the overall unemployment
rate of the country. Finally, such a program could contribute to greater
worker satisfaction and productivity in those plants which become wholly
employee-owned. 79

IV. CONCLUSION

Employee stock ownership plans which guarantee employees full voting control over all employer securities held by the ESOT can yield
valuable benefits. If the ESOT holds a great enough percentage of the
corporation's securities, the employees will be assured of substantial
participation in corporate affairs and a large share of corporate earnings.
These advantages can make up for the greater risks inherent in the

the corporation out of their post-tax savings. Hence, employees can use an ESOP to defer
taxation and thus effectively reduce cost of employer securities.
75
For example, the employees who purchased the South Bend Lathe Co. and the
Vermont Asbestos Group were unable to secure private financing without governmental
guarantees. See note 66 supra.
76
The United States Economic Development Administration (EDA) has already assisted
the employees of one company, the South Bend Lathe Co., keep a plant open. The EDA
provided the city of South Bend with five million dollars to be loaned to the South Bend
Lathe Co. ESOT, thereby enabling the employees to purchase their plant and keep it in
operation. M. CONTE & A. TANNENBAUM, supra note 43, at 39. A much larger program
should be established to make loans directly to ESOTs. In order to reduce the outlay of·
public funds, such a program could even integrate the administration costs into the loan
charges repayable by the ESOTs.
77
This condition could be satisfied by requiring that each applicant make a bona fide
attempt to secure private financing and by requiring applicants to present letters refusing
loans from one or more local lending institutions.
78
Applications for assistance could be required to include supporting information in
sufficient detail to enable the government to analyze the technical and economic feasibility
of the proposal. In some cases the government may require a technical and economic
feasibility study prepared by an independent consultant.
79
See notes 43, 45 & 46 supra.
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undiversified investments of ESOTs. Clearly, however, the Federal government should modify the present ESOP laws to ensure that only ESOPs
which transfer a substantial percentage of voting corporate securities to
the ESOT and which pass through full voting rights to employees will be
entitled to preferential tax treatment.
ESOPs can also serve the important function of enabling employees to
purchase their corporations. ESOPs can be used to prevent the closing of
economically viable plants and to preserve jobs. In order to facilitate this
use of ESOPs, the Federal government should develop a major program
to provide financial assistance to employees who wish to keep their plants
operating through ESOP employee buyouts. Such a program could help
reduce unemployment and promote local economic stability.
-Jonathan Barry Forman

